multitude of possible offshore activities, this Article will focus solely on navigation. Part I discusses the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which seems to have finally become a generally accepted legal cornerstone for appreciating the legal status of these waters. Part I considers climate change in the Arctic and Part III elaborates on how this may impact the legal regime of navigation there. Subsequently, Part IV analyzes the vulnerability as well as the adaptive capacity of the 1982 Convention. Finally, Part V suggests how the existing legal system can better meet the new challenges climate change poses for Arctic water expanses.
I. THE 1982 CONVENTION
In contrast to the Antarctic, where international cooperation has formed the essence of the development of a very specific international legal regime applicable in the area, as evidenced in a good number of international agreements, the Arctic generally lacks such an integrated and comprehensive regime based on regional multilateral cooperation. 4 Moreover, it is startling to see that the polar bear, which triggered the conclusion of the first multilateral instrument joining all five Arctic rim countries,' has become the face of the campaign trying to stop climate change in the Arctic. This implies that if this quest to stop climate change were to be unsuccessful, 6 one of the few hard law instruments specifically conceived of for the Arctic will disappear together with its object, the polar bear. The preferred method of regional cooperation in the Arctic has recently been coined "soft sleddings," a process expected to continue during the next decade. 7 And no matter how significant this "mosaic of cooperative arrangements" might be,' binding hard law instruments remain an Arctic rarity.
This does not mean that the Arctic is a free for all, located beyond the confines of international law. 9 On the contrary, a clear tendency can be discerned during the last decade or so toward a common acceptance by countries in general, and more importantly the Arctic rim countries in particular, that the 1982 Convention contains the generally applicable legal framework in the area.
First of all, this latter tendency has to do with states' attitudes toward the instrument itself. The 1982 Convention, envisioned to 9. This idea is sometimes implied in recent analyses of this issue. See, e.g., Scott G. Borgerson, Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming, 87 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 63, 74 (2008) (calling the Arctic a "legal no man's land"). After having stated that the Arctic is "not currently governed by any comprehensive multilateral norms and regulations," and affirmed that "there are currently no overarching . . . legal structures that can provide for the orderly development of the region," the author subsequently mentions the 1982 Convention, which, according to him, "cannot be seamlessly applied to the Arctic." Id. at 65, 71-72. But, all the examples given to prove this latter point, namely the division of the continental shelf, regime of navigation, maritime boundary delimitation, and the issue of flags of convenience, are all elements that this convention addresses either directly, or by reference to other competent international organizations. Id. at 72.
become the Constitution for the Oceans,o seems well on its way to achieving that status." Moreover, when focusing on the Arctic rim countries proper, it appears that while Norway and the Russian Federation ratified that convention during the second half of the 1990s, 12 Canada and Denmark did so only more recently." None of these countries included a direct reference to the Arctic in any of their declarations made upon signature or ratification.
14 As of today, the United States is the only Arctic rim country that is not yet a party to the 1982 Convention, despite the recent presidential initiative in this 14. Given its particular importance with respect to the Arctic, it might nevertheless be appropriate to highlight the fact that the Russian Federation specifically inserted between "sea boundary delimitations" and "disputes concerning military activities," (both excluded on the basis of Article 298, Section (1)(a)(i) ["Art. 298 (1)(a)(i)"] of the 1982 Convention in its declaration made at the time of signature) "historic bays or titles" when rephrasing its declaration at the time of ratification.
United Nations, Declarations and Statements (2010), http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention agreements/conventiondeclarations.htm [hereinafter U.N. Declarations]. Also, this latter addition, it should be noted, is in full conformity with the provision of Art. 298 (1)(a)(i). See 1982 Convention, supra note 3, at art. 298(l)(a)(i). Canada also included "historic bays or titles" in its list of exclusion at the time of ratification. Although not exclusively linked to the Arctic, it might be noted that both countries also added delimitation issues to the list, as provided by the same article. See U.N. Declarations, supra.
respect.1 5 It is noteworthy that the Arctic ranks high on the agenda of some authors who presently want to speed up this process.' 6 Nevertheless, this absence of ratification by one of the major actors in the region does not put into question the tendency toward common acceptance of the 1982 Convention as the generally applicable legal framework in the area, as the United States has always agreed to abide by the vast majority of the provisions of the 1982 Convention 7 and clearly considered this agreement to govern the Arctic as well."
Secondly, the Decree in the 1986 Soviet Notices to Mariners as appropriate and necessary in order to indicate that the territorial sea around these islands was Soviet and to control navigation of foreign warships. See Timchenko, supra note 25, at 33. But since all territorial claims had long since been settled in that area, the relevance of such argumentation in the past is to be doubted. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. This is true even if Wrangel is considered, as this island is not one in which the regime of innocent passage is of particular relevance (similar to other islands with overlapping territorial seas or straight baselines linking the island to the mainland).
A fortiori, such argumentation is no longer convincing at present because of the Russian acceptance of the right of innocent passage of warships in the territorial sea in the meantime. See generally Erik Franckx, Further Steps in the Clarification and translated into English a year later, takes a similar approach and adds:
[I]t follows, in our view, that one should proceed from the fact that the maritime expanses of the Northern Arctic Ocean are by their legal status subdivided into those same categories as the water expanses of the entire World Ocean, the legal regime of which is provided for in the 1982 [Convention] . 32 It seems therefore safe to conclude that the latter idea is generally adhered to today in Russian doctrine. 33 In 2001, when Robin Churchill considered whether claims to maritime zones in the Arctic were to be considered as law of the sea normality or polar peculiarity, he had no difficulty in concluding that maritime zones were a law of the sea normality. Even if Canada and Russia might be considered somewhat ambiguous in this regard, Churchill nevertheless concluded that "this ambiguity stems more from writers (and primarily from writers of the past) than their governments." 34 3 is of particular relevance here. It notes a 5-10% estimated reduction in annual average sea-ice extent, most prominent in summer, as well as a 10-15% reduction in average thickness over the past few decades, with a 40% reduction in the central Arctic Ocean. 39 Based on this data, longer seasons of less seaice cover of reduced thickness are expected, "implying improved ship accessibility around the margins of the Arctic Basin (although this will not be uniformly distributed As far as the Northern Sea Route is concerned, it is predicted that based on models derived from the above-made observations, the number of navigable days (days per year with less than 50% sea-ice concentration) will increase from 20-30 days in 2004 to 90-100 days in 2080.42 And, since icebreakers are able to manage waters with a sea-ice concentration of 75%, this would in fact open up the Northern Sea Route to 150 days by 2080. 43 The picture with respect to the Northwest Passage, however, is much more nuanced because the ice conditions in this part of the Arctic are less predictable. First of all, the Canadian Arctic is characterized by a high year-to-year variability despite the general decrease in sea-ice tendency since the late 1960s. 44 Moreover, because of the restricted nature of the waters inside the Canadian northern islands, the melting tendency could result in more icebergs moving into the routes normally used for navigation. 45 With respect to the Northwest Passage, the synthesis concludes that "despite widespread retreat of sea ice around the Arctic Basin, it is clear that the unusual geography of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago creates exceptionally complex sea ice conditions and a high degree of variability for the decades ahead." without sea ice are now being predicted as soon as within the next forty years.4 8 This contrasts sharply with the possibility raised in 2004 that in place of an ice-free summer, changing climate patterns could instead usher in a new ice-age. 49 But, this scenario seems so farfetched that the scientific community reacted by characterizing it as highly unlikely. 50 Other phenomena may have been speeding up the present increase in melting, such as prevailing wind patterns during the 1990s, which might predict a slowdown in the melt rate in the future. 5 Other scientists suggest a more cyclic temporary reprieve. 5 2 Still, others emphasize that there is a lack of spatial uniformity in the melting pattern of, for instance, the Northwest Passage itself. 5 3 Nevertheless, the general trend towards "a seasonally ice-free Arctic Ocean as the system warms seems increasingly certain. The unresolved questions regard when this new arctic state will be realized, how rapid the , available at http://www.climate.org/PDF/clim-change scenario.pdf. The argument is that because of the melting ice, freshwater will change the structure of the usually salty and dense waters in the North and cause a thermohaline circulation collapse, preventing the warm Gulf stream from reaching the Arctic basin any longer. This scenario was picked up in the press afterwards. Certainly, the dramatic rate at which melting has occurred lately has clear implications for navigation in the area. Satellite images captured during the exceptional summer of 2007 clearly indicate that the whole Northern Sea Route, including its natural choke point, Vil'kitskii Strait, 5 was totally ice-free. 5 6 Even more surprising, during the summer of 2007, the Northwest Passage was totally ice-free as well. 5 
III. PROJECTED CONSEQUENCES IN THE LEGAL SPHERE
One can assume with reasonable certainty that the Arctic ice will diminish in extent, as well as in thickness, during the years to come. Even though the exact timeframe remains open to conjecture, the effects this will have on the legal regime of navigation in the Arctic seem considerable. At least five submissions can be made in this respect.
5 8 First, as navigation becomes more intensive, the urge to conclude maritime boundary agreements will increase accordingly. As of now, almost all of these boundaries are awaiting final settlement. Secondly, present-day solutions to navigational problems will soon become totally insufficient. The so-called "agreement to disagree" 59 concluded between Canada and the United States in the wake of the Polar Sea crossing in 1985, for instance, will no longer be sufficient to regulate navigational issues between these two countries because this agreement is restricted to the crossings of U.S. Coast Guard vessels only. 60 Third, the validity of the straight baselines, especially the exact status of the waters so enclosed, will become topical once again. Fourth, whether the Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passage can be considered straits used for international navigation will become a very acute and extremely difficult issue to solve. Fifth, as the melting process continues to increase over time, coastal states' reliance on Art. 234 of the 1982 Convention ["Art. 234"] in order to restrict foreign navigation in the area will become less and less effective.
Will the 1982 Convention, believed to constitute the applicable legal regime, be able to take all these new concerns, triggered by climate warming in the Arctic, into consideration to allow an orderly development in the area? The next part will try to respond to this question.
IV. VULNERABILITY AND ADAPTIVE CAPACITY OF THE 1982 CONVENTION
A. Vulnerability
Low-level Vulnerability
The vulnerability of the 1982 Convention could be considered to stem from the attempt of its drafters to draw up one single legal instrument covering the whole law of the sea. This attempt is contrary to the previous approach taken by the International Law Commission when preparing the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1958. The 1958 conference resulted in the adoption of four nicely separated conventions, from which states could then pick and choose, supplemented by an optional dispute settlement protocol. 61 The 1982 Convention, in contrast, intends to cover all activities in all oceans, including the Arctic. inferred by the 1982 Convention's inclusion of a special section in Part XII (Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment), containing only one article with the same title as the section to which it belongs-"ice-covered areas." 62 The genesis of this particular article clearly underlines that it was meant to be applied specifically to the Arctic. 63 It is easy to question how one short, single article could possibly deal with all the maritime issues of the Arctic, suggesting that this document is flawed as a governing legal framework in that area.
As already implied in Part I, while looking at things this way may be attractive to the layman, this approach can hardly be considered a sensible one from an international law point of view. 64 As far as navigation is concerned, the 1982 Convention clearly starts from the premise-finally accepted by all Arctic states today, as argued in Part I-that normal rules of navigation apply in that area as well. This means that whether the issue concerns internal waters, baselines, bays, straits, territorial seas, exclusive economic zones or high seas-to name but the most salient ones-the relevant parts of the 62. 1982 Convention, supra note 3, at art. 234. Art. 234 reads: Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone, where particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance. Such laws and regulations shall have due regard to navigation and the protection and preservation of the marine environment based on the best available scientific evidence.
Id.
63. This article, which is sometimes referred to as "the Arctic article," was negotiated directly between the three countries most concerned at the time, namely Canada, the former Soviet Union, and the 
to establish sovereign rights over the seabed and subsoil beyond the 200 n.m. limit, but it also created a special body, the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, to help settle the outer limit of this area of state authority.
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The unitary character of this document is therefore, by itself, not to be considered as a prohibiting factor, preventing this document from securing an operational legal system in the Arctic. Instead, the fact that the dispute settlement provisions form an integral part of the package will prove to be a non-negligible advantage with respect to navigational matters, a point further developed in Part IV.B. The unitary character of the 1982 Convention can therefore be considered to fall in the category of low-level vulnerabilities.
B. Medium-level Vulnerability
Nevertheless, one must admit that this basic approach of the 1982 Convention, whereby the general rules on the law of the sea apply to the Arctic as well, with only one specific article solely devoted to the area in question, may imply that this legal document "cannot be seamlessly applied to the Arctic," as already mentioned. former Soviet Union, which were either protested at the time of enactment on paper 68 or thereafter in practice. 69 Another example is the claim to historic waters in the Arctic, which in Canada concerns waters on the inside of those baselines, 70 but in Russia also possibly concerns waters outside those baselines. Also, the reliance on the sector lines with respect to maritime delimitation (which Canada relies upon in its dispute with the United States, and Russia in its dispute with Norway), 7 1 as well as the question whether the Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passage are, or could become, straits used for international navigation, can be mentioned in this respect. Finally, the issue of the correct application of Art. 234 (the only article in the 1982 Convention dealing exclusively with the Arctic, as already mentioned) can be raised in this respect, especially since parts of it can be considered as still being developed, 7 2 such as its "due regard" provision through the International Maritime Organization as indicated below.
Most of these issues are highly contentious under present-day international law. With respect to the conformity of the baselines to international law, one finds arguments on both sides of the spectrum in legal writings relating to Canada 73 as well as Russia. Whether the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage should be considered straits used for international navigation is an issue still as hotly debated now as it was more than twenty years ago. 80 How underwater navigation by submarines may impact this discussion is also hotly debated. It might be telling that in a recent article, an American scholar subtly referred to the statement-that the Northwest Passage had just been opened by two U.S. atomic submarines-by the chairman of the U.S. delegation to the second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1960.82 Military cooperation between the American and Canadian armed forces only further complicates this issue. 83 Finally, since Art. 234 has been negotiated directly between Canada, the former Soviet Union and the United States-countries with totally opposing interests in the area-it should not come as a surprise that problems of interpretation remain. In fact, this article has been described from the start as "probably the most ambiguous, if not controversial, clause in the entire treaty," 84 or in a more metaphorical manner as "a witch's brew, a caldron of legal uncertainty which could be stirred in favour of either the coastal or shipping state. in its final report of 2000, gives a good overview of these many difficulties of interpretation. 86 Despite the legal framework available, are we still lost at sea if the only article specifically applicable to the Arctic does not really provide clear and firm guidance?
It is not the goal of this Article to try to give concrete answers to the above-mentioned outstanding Arctic issues in the framework of the 1982 Convention, based on a detailed legal analysis. Moreover, space limitations would not allow for such an analysis. This Article's purpose is simply to illustrate that the 1982 Convention certainly has its vulnerabilities, and that the lack of specificity may be considered one of them. Certainly, if the law is not clear and is open to broadly diverging interpretations, states will naturally try to construe the law in a way most advantageous to their own situation. With respect to the legal nature of the Northwest Passage, it has, for instance, even been doubted whether the 1982 Convention provides the definitive answer. 87 Since these national claims appear to be developed praeter or secundum legem, they are qualified as medium-level vulnerabilities for the purpose of this study.
C. High-level Vulnerability
Even more than the lack of specificity, the real vulnerability of the 1982 Convention is believed to stem from the attempts of certain coastal states to unilaterally try to change the content of certain convention provisions, which was set up as a package deal from which no derogations are allowed. 88 This trend of so-called creeping jurisdiction-which at times has put pressure on the 1982 Convention in other areas 89 -certainly existed in the Arctic in the past, 90 and still has a tendency to resurface there. Indeed, in some instances the normal reading of the law does appear to be clear. Nevertheless, states develop arguments with respect to such clear provisions, no longer secundum or praeter legem, but rather contra legem. One such example will be given for each of the two gate holders of Arctic shipping, namely Canada and Russia.
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Canada
As far as Canada is concerned, the application of Article 8, Section 2 of the 1982 Convention ("Art. 8 (2)") springs to mind. This Article reads as follows: " [W] here the establishment of a straight baseline in accordance with the method set forth in article 7 [(straight baselines)] has the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas which had not previously been considered as such, a right of innocent passage as provided in this Convention shall exist in those waters." 91 It seems undeniable that before drawing straight baselines in 1985, Canada did not consider the waters on the inside of these baselines as internal waters. The mere fact that the governmental reaction to the Manhattan crisis between 1969 and 1970 consisted, inter alia, of enlarging the territorial sea to 12 n.m. (in order to be able to better control shipping at the east and west entrances of the Northwest Passage) appears to be sufficient proof of the matter.
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One detailed argument suggests that as long as Canada was not a party to the 1982 Convention, Art. 8 (2) did not apply to it. 93 Yet, it appeared logical to conclude that if Canada became a party to this legal instrument, Art. 8 (2) would fully apply. As mentioned above, the latter happened in 2003. 94 conclusion that these baselines were drawn nearly twenty years before Canada joined the 1982 Convention. 95 At that time, Canada was not bound by Art. 8 (2) or the corresponding rule of the 1958 Convention (to which Canada was not a party), nor a corresponding rule of customary law. 96 The argument is that the rule contained in Art. 8 (2) is not automatically compulsory for all parties to the 1982 Convention, but only for those who established straight baselines after they became a party to the 1982 Convention. 97 A similar line of reasoning can also be found in the writings of other Canadian authors.
9 8 These authors sometimes stress the fact that the explicit wording "in accordance with . .. article 7," to be found in Art. 8 (2), further exonerates Canada in a more formal sense because it did not establish its system of straight baselines in 1985 on the legal basis of article 7 ("Art. 7"), since it was not yet a party to the 1982
Convention.
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The substantive argument seems rather strange, as it would imply, for instance, that if a country like Peru were to become a party to the 1982 Convention tomorrow, it could claim that article 3, establishing a maximum territorial sea width of 12 n.m., would not be applicable to it. At the time Peru claimed a 200 n.m. zone, it was neither bound by this article, nor by the 1958 Convention (indirectly limiting the territorial sea to a maximum of 12 n.m.), nor by customary international law (the exact content of which was at that time very much contested). This kind of intertemporal application of the 1982 Convention stands at odds with the package deal approach, which forms its backbone. as 'one gigantic package deal."' 00 Also, the more formalistic argument, based on the explicit reference to Art. 7, is not really convincing because Art. 8 (2) simply refers to "the method" set forth in Art. 7, not that particular article of that particular convention.
Russia
With respect to Russia, a non-negligible issue concerns the exact field of application of the Russian regulations concerning the Northern Sea Route.' 0 By itself, the concept of the Northern Sea Route is not free from ambiguity when compared to the related notion of the Northeast Passage. Authors very often find it essential to stress the importance of the difference, but when trying to explain the distinguishing elements the picture becomes rather hazy. 102 As it presently stands, the Northern Sea Route forms part, be it a basic part, of the Northeast Passage, which is the larger entity.
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This primarily has to do with the horizontal extent of both seaways. The Northern Sea Route is said to start in the Arctic in the west from the western entrances of Novaia Zemlia, 104 whereas the at 9, 9-10. The Northeast Passage can therefore be described as covering all maritime areas north of the Eurasian continent and limited by the maritime boundary with Norway to the West, the maritime boundary with the US to the East, and the North Pole to the North.
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104. 1990 Regulations for Navigation on the Seaways of the Northern Sea Route, approved by USSR Minister of Merchant Marine, Sept. 14, 1990, available at http://www.morflot.ru/about/sevmorput/en/ (follow the "Rules of Navigation.doc" hyperlink for English translation).
Northeast Passage also includes the Barents Sea. However, recent statements made by the Director of the Northern Sea Route Administration, A. Gorshkovsky---declaring that the 1996 Guide to Navigation (applicable to the Northern Sea Route) also applies to the ice-covered parts of the Barents Sea' 05 _and, inter alia, the editors of a recent authoritative book on the Northern Sea Route-stating that the Route's "ftnctional boundaries" extend to the ice-covered parts of the southeastern Barents Sea' 06 -seem to blur the only remaining clear distinction between the Northeast Passage and the Northern Sea Route.
When one looks at the difference in vertical application of the Northeast Passage and the Northern Sea Route, one runs into even more difficulties. Because the present-day Russian legislation applicable to the Northern Sea Route is based on the extended competence granted to coastal states in ice-covered areas in accordance with Art. 234, it normally implies that the application of this particular legal framework should be restricted to the 200 n.m. exclusive economic zone. Everything beyond that falls under the concept of the Northeast Passage. However, when the 1990 Regulations were established, it was argued that the Northern Sea Route varies great distances in latitude depending on the ice conditions-sometimes even passing through portions of the high seas.' 07 Today, this position seems to be the prevailing attitude in Russian doctrine, reflected not only in the specialized literature on the law of the sea,"os but also in general works on international law.1 09 The Russian practice of experimenting with variants to the standard itineraries normally followed by ships plying the Northern Sea Route'l 0 seems to be particularly relevant in this respect.'I'
All of this seems to boil down to the position that in the Arctic, the Northern Sea Route equates to the Northeast Passage-certainly east of the western entrances to Novaia Zemlia as already suggested in certain western publications,11 2 and maybe even including large parts of the Barents Sea. How all this is to be reconciled with the straightforward notions of Art. 234, using terminology such as "within the limits of the exclusive economic zone" and "the presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year," 1 3 is extremely hard to understand.
Since such examples seem to contradict the basic legal framework applicable in the Arctic, they have been qualified as high-level vulnerabilities for the purpose of the present paper. 
B. Adaptive Capacity
In view of all these vulnerabilities of the 1982 Convention, the next question I address is whether this document, and the atypical regime it represents, possesses sufficient adaptive capacity to alleviate these new strains global warming poses upon the Arctic navigation regime.
Indeed, the 1982 Convention is different from many other international agreements in that it neither bestows a specifically established body nor the conference of the parties with the specific task of developing the instrument itself. Even though the conference of the parties is mentioned in article 319, this body has merely been attributed with administrative powers relating to appointments or financial matters. Whether this body also has the power to review the functioning of the 1982 Convention itself is far from clear since widely diverging opinions exist among states in this respect. 114 Furthermore, no procedure to further develop the instrument through protocols or annexes has been included in this document; only an amendment procedure (articles 312-16) is provided, which appears rather difficult to apply in practice. 115 Despite these specificities, the overall adaptive capacity of this document has not been considered inferior to other dynamic or living instruments. A substantial mix of additional legally binding agreements-whether universal or regional-and soft law clearly make the 1982 Convention a non selfcontained legal regime.11 6 The general adaptive capacity of the latter regime finds no exception in the Arctic, as will be argued next. It is believed that this document is rather well equipped to deal with the different possible scenarios, especially as far as navigation in the Arctic is concerned. First of all, one may not forget that Art. 234 is quite exceptional in the overall framework of the 1982 Convention. Art. 234 is the only place where national rules concerning vesselsource pollution need not conform to generally accepted international rules and standards. 1 17 Art. 234 implies that if Arctic shipping picks up, the coastal states retaining control over the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage will have ample room to protect their maritime zones. At the same time, however, it must be noted that coastal states' extensive powers are not totally discretionary, for Art. 234 contains the obligation that they give "due regard to navigation,""' while establishing their laws and regulations concerning shipping.
The flexibility included in this notion enhances the adaptive capacity of the article. The fact that the parties involved will very often have a different interpretation of this vague notion is not to be considered an added vulnerability; Art. 234 remains subject to the system of compulsory dispute settlement, as stressed by Conclusion No. 14 of the Committee on Coastal State Jurisdiction Relating to Marine Pollution of the International Law Association.' 19 If shipping increases in the future, a neutral third party appointed in accordance with Part XV of the 1982 Convention (Settlement of Disputes) will always be able to give concrete content to this vague notion, balancing the interests of both the coastal state and the flag state. Or, as stated by one author:
As these duties of due regard are mutually applicable, the potential for them to regulate a dispute between users is slight. It is only when due regard obligations can be subjected to third-party procedures that the possibility exists for these duties to have a The ultimate purpose of Part XV is to balance the coastal state powers granted in Parts V (Exclusive Economic Zone) and XII (Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment) to the advantage of the freedom of navigation. 121 While Art. 234 leaves large discretion to the coastal state when regulating navigation in ice-infested waters, it clearly does not give the coastal state carte blanche; thus, if shipping were to increase in the future, it allows for the orderly development of the law. The guidelines in the framework of the International Maritime Organization for ships operating in icecovered waters,122 as well as the additional work by the International Association of Classification Societies in this respect, 123 may already be considered a multilateral effort trying to give concrete content to this notion of due regard in the framework of Art. 234.124 Part XV of the 1982 Convention was primarily accepted by its founding fathers in order to "maintain the integrity of the Convention's compromise package."l 25 Art. 234 forms a case in point as far as the practical implementation of this general policy is concerned. Moreover, the interpretation given to such terms is not ex tunc, but ex nunc; so, if shipping increases as a result of climate change, "due regard" will have to be interpreted in a context of increased navigation and not in that of the sporadic journeys as they existed in 1982 when this 120 The only article of the 1982 Convention exclusively dealing with the Arctic seems especially well suited to take into account climate change not only in a medium, but also in a long-term perspective. As further warming, in a first phase, will most probably make ice-breaker assisted navigation more plausible, the situation just described will apply. But if in the long run not only ice-free summers, but maybe even ice-free winters were to become a reality, the adaptive capacity of Art. 234 appears to be extremely well suited to take into consideration such new developments as well. It must be remembered that the notion of Arctic waters is nowhere used in the article; it only mentions "ice-covered areas," which has been defined in the article itself, as already mentioned above, as "ice covering such areas for most of the year."
1 27 So, even were ice to disappear completely in the Arctic, this article would be well adapted to the different steps in the climatic process leading up to that eventuality. The article would simply stop being operative any longer somewhere along that process, implying that no specific coastal state powers are needed anymore and these Arctic waters would become totally governed by the normal rules of navigation to be found elsewhere in the 1982 Convention.
Since there appears to be no good reason why Art. 8 (2) should be excluded from the compulsory dispute settlement part of the 1982 Convention, it seems that those issues that have been characterized as high-level vulnerabilities are covered by Part XV. Therefore, these high-level vulnerabilities should not normally disturb the navigational regime if and when that navigational regime becomes fully operational. Instead, all these issues would be solved by making use of the procedures explicitly provided by the 1982 Convention for those purposes.
Part III (Straits used for International Navigation) should not be excluded from the system of compulsory dispute settlement either, especially since it squarely relates to the freedom of navigation. The same, in principle, holds true with respect to the issue of straight baselines. However, if straight baselines were tangled up with other issues, such as historic waters or maritime boundary delimitation, it 30 Consequently, these latter issues will remain without a solution if the parties cannot find common ground in a negotiated manner; however, the vulnerability of these issues in the Arctic can hardly be considered as specific to that area.
Moreover, the qualification of the 1982 Convention as the Constitution for the Oceans, as previously mentioned, should not give the impression that further developments are especially hard or even impossible to reach. Indeed, constitutions come in different forms and while some of them have proven difficult to amend, others have been changed on a rather regular basis. The 1982 Convention clearly falls into the latter category, for it has already been "implemented" twice. 131 Nothing prevents it from being "implemented" a third time, if this should prove necessary. And though some have suggested this should happen with respect to the Arctic in general,1 32 I am not convinced that such development should be envisaged at present, and certainly not in order to be able to cope with future navigational issues. Of course, the conclusion of regional agreements, which the 1982 Convention does not preclude, is always possible. Scholars contend that the regional agreements constitute "a significant source of further development of the law of the sea."l 33 Once again, the Arctic forms no exception, as a certain interplay with the 1982 Convention has already been noted.1 34 These regional agreements can encompass either the involvement of competent international organizations, in casu the International Maritime Organization, or regional navigational arrangements, as suggested by others,'
35 so long as these regional agreements comply with Article 311 of the 1982 Convention. As already mentioned, the 2002 Guidelines may provide a good example of the former.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Starting out from the predicted climate change, indicating that ice cover in the Arctic Ocean will continue to diminish during the years to come, this Article highlights some navigational concerns that will most certainly require increased international attention in the future. Even though the exact timing may remain open to conjecture at present, the fact that these issues will arrive on the international agenda seems generally accepted.
This Article also highlights the vulnerabilities of the international legal regime based on the 1982 Convention, which seems to be generally accepted by all major players in the Arctic today as containing the basic legal rules governing the area. For mere didactical purposes, a distinction was made between low, medium and high-level vulnerabilities. This Article reaches the conclusion that the listed high-level vulnerabilities, as well as a good number of mediumlevel vulnerabilities, can be solved in a satisfactory manner on the basis of the 1982 Convention itself. Other medium-level vulnerabilities, it must be admitted, cannot; but this difficulty is not specific to the Arctic region. It is nevertheless presumed that if navigation really starts to pick up in the Arctic, the coastal states will feel the urge to further their efforts at arriving at a negotiated solution with more vigor, whether it concerns maritime boundary questions or more strict navigational issues. In a region as sensitive as the Arctic, for instance, the grounding of a vessel in a contested zone might easily trigger similar heated reactions as between Greece and Turkey during the mid-1990s, even in the absence of territorial disputes over islands. 136 With respect to navigational issues as such, the transformation of the 2002 Guidelines into a legally binding document should be envisaged.1
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The submission is therefore made that the 1982 Convention appears to have enough adaptive capacity to develop increased navigation into the Arctic in an orderly manner once it occurs. Now that all directly interested players finally accept the 1982 Convention as the basic legal regime governing the Arctic, it would be counterproductive to create a totally novel legal instrument. It is hoped the obligation for state parties to settle most future disputes in this area in accordance with the Part XV of the 1982 Convention will break the vicious circle of unilateral action-reaction, which has been so typical of the development of the Arctic navigational matters so far. It is therefore hoped that the United States will become a party to this document before the Arctic really opens up. The possibility of increased navigation in the Arctic adds one more good reason to the already long list of reasons why the U.S. Senate should give its advice and consent to this document. That this document is nevertheless more nuanced is demonstrated by the following policy objective: "The full implementation of already existing obligations, rather than proposing new legal instruments should be advocated. This however should not preclude work on further developing some of the frameworks, adapting them to new conditions or Arctic specificities." Id. at 10.
consider. First, on January 20, 2011, the European Parliament adopted a non-legislative resolution, entitled "A Sustainable EU Policy for the High North," in response to the aforementioned communication of the Commission. 142 Secondly, all Arctic rim countries, with the exception of Norway, which already enacted its Arctic policy on All these novel elements, in other words, seem to confirm the gist of this Article. The only caveat seems to be a dissonant stream in Russian scholarship opining that Russia should not make a second submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf because Part XI of the 1982 Convention, entitled "The Area," is not applicable to the Arctic.153 No matter how interesting a detailed analysis of this strand of argumentation might appear from a legal point of view, it will suffice for present purposes to simply mention it here as a concluding remark of this post-script, while postponing a more substantive analysis for the time being. 
